City should reject Ports Toronto’s wholly inadequate “Environmental Assessment”
- Parks not Planes
- Jun 26
- 20 min read
Last October 9, following intense lobbying by Ports Toronto (PT), Toronto City Council agreed to extend its lease of a portion of the Island Airport lands to PT for 12 years, from June 30, 2033.
That extension was to assist it in financing [1] the construction of a soon to be required Runway End Safety Area (RESA) at each end of the main runway, on the condition that an environmental assessment be conducted “to the satisfaction of the City, acting reasonably”.
PT recently announced that it had completed an assessment. Reviewing it, we found fundamental flaws that lead to the necessary conclusion that the City reject it as unsatisfactory.
Our letter to the Director of the City’s Waterfront Secretariat, setting out those flaws is below.
In summary,
• The scope of the “assessment” was far too narrow, failing to
consider the option of not proceeding with RESA,
address safety concerns that suggest a longer RESA is necessary, and
adequately consider a commonly used Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS), which would be cheaper, more effective, and avoid having to landfill our harbour.
By skipping a true “no‐build” baseline and a comprehensive review of land‐use options, the “assessment” abdicates its core duty to explore whether the airport should operate at all in its current location
The minimum standards for environmental assessments were not met
Public engagement, required by those minimum standards, was woefully inadequate. Public consultation is limited to a 30-day comment period with no commitment to substantive follow-up, undermining community trust.
The business prospects for the Island Airport were unexamined, and appear bleak, with
commercial air traffic now at less than half of its peak, owing to the greater flight selection at Pearson and the popularity of the Union Pearson Express and
high speed rail travel to Montreal and Ottawa, which, once built, would displace much of the air travel to those cities – the airport’s core business.
CALL TO ACTION: Now is the time to tell Mayor Chow and City Councillors that the City must reject this deeply flawed “environmental assessment”. Write to Mayor Chow: mayor_chow@toronto.ca and your councillor: Find your councillor here.
24 June, 2025
David Stonehouse
Director, Waterfront Secretariat
City of Toronto
Dear Mr. Stonehouse,
Re: Ports Toronto’s RESA “EA”
We write to you as the City is facing a significant decision – whether to accept the “environmental assessment” prepared for Ports Toronto for its proposed Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs).
As set out in detail below, that “assessment” (we don’t believe it should be accepted as, in any way, sufficient, and therefore use quotes) is so deficient in so many ways that it cannot satisfy the City’s requirement, set out in the January 25, 2025 agreement to extend the City’s lease to Ports Toronto for a portion of the Island Airport lands:
The Lessee shall complete an Environmental Assessment for RESA at its sole expense, prior to the commencement of construction, and to the satisfaction of the City, acting reasonably.
We urge the City to reject that “assessment” and insist that one be conducted that meets the City’s and the community’s more than reasonable expectations.
Our grounds for this request are set out in the Sections below. The Sections are:
1. Scope for too narrow
Ports Toronto examined three scenarios in its “assessment”. All assumed a 150m RESA would be built at each end of the main runway. This entails, for just the least invasive option, a landmass expansion of approximately 14,000 square meters. This would be achieved by extending the runway ends by 135-145 meters, with the expansion extending 54 meters out from the existing seawall [2].
Without public engagement in its design, PortsToronto selected those three options for its purported environmental assessment, with the objective of selecting one of them.
Missing entirely was a fourth option not building the required RESAs, and a fifth – building a RESA sufficient to address actual safety risks.
PortsToronto’s purported assessment only considered which of the three RESA options it had chosen for assessment is preferable and failed to include any consideration of whether the RESA project should proceed at all.
A narrowly based study on moving earth around and filling in waters around the Airport (options 1 3) does not take into account the continuing environmental effects of the less than 100 daily commercial flights currently at the Airport nor those envisioned from the expansion of the number of flights planned under the Airport 2018 Airport Master Plan, both of which are only possible with completion of the RESAs.
The “Do nothing” alternative, and the alternative of building an effective RESA that would actually ensure safety at the airport, were not considered.
1a: "Do nothing"
As noted in the Gap Analysis, prepared for Ports Toronto, the City of Toronto had submitted that the environmental assessment of Porter’s failed proposal to fly jets from the Island Airport include:
A “Do Nothing” scenario [to] assess existing conditions without improvements to airside and groundside operations, incorporating issues raised by the city and local community (e.g., groundside traffic, noise, air quality) under baseline conditions.
As it did then, our City must insist that this option must be included.
That option (we call it Option 4) would save at least public funds of $61-64M, the estimated cost of Option 1, and as it would require most of the remaining commercial traffic to move to Pearson, would entail an full assessment of the positive and negative aspects of a significant decrease in commercial passenger numbers at the Airport.
Once Ports Toronto opted to exclude the “Do Nothing” scenario, the balance of its “EA” becomes meaningless to the public and the community.
An assessment need not always conclude that a project may be carried out – it may conclude that “Doing Nothing” is preferable, from an impact perspective, to proceeding with the proposed project [3].
By excluding” Do Nothing” from its analysis, Ports Toronto has failed to consider all the alternatives, and for that reason alone, its “EA” should be found unacceptable.
International standards do require that the “no build” alternative be included in an assessment. For example, according to Section 15126.6(e)(1) of the California Environmental Quality Act Guidelines:
The specific alternative of “no project” shall also be evaluated along with its impact. The purpose of describing and analyzing a no project alternative is to allow decision makers to compare the impacts of approving the proposed project with the impacts of not approving the proposed project. The no project alternative analysis is not the baseline for determining whether the proposed project’s environmental impacts may be significant, unless it is identical to the existing environmental setting analysis which does establish that baseline.
The merits of that Option 4 must be weighed against the merits of the continued operation of the Airport.
Ports Toronto’s acquisition of the Airport lands without payment, was by the enactment of a federal statute, and another statute can as easily convert the use of those lands to more benign uses than aviation.
Such an assessment needs to consider what the best use should be for the valuable (some would say most valuable) 85 hectares (210 acres) in our City and include extensive and robust public engagement.
We assume PortsToronto can fully fund this project from proceeds of its sale of 30 Bay Street ($96M) and the Parliament Slip ($20M, paid by Waterfront Toronto, another government agency) and its cash reserves. Both properties were acquired by Ports Toronto for free, and were originally transferred, without charge, we understand, in 1911 to The Toronto Harbour Commission by the City of Toronto.
We submit that Ports Toronto should not be free to spend those public funds without an appropriate public process for deciding on their use.
We submit that the most appropriate use of those $61-64M of public funds needs to be part of this discussion – there are many possible expenditures that have more merit than spending them on RESAs for the Airport.
1b: Building an effective RESA
We’ve watched with concern, the recent runway overshoots – at Vancouver last November 19, and more recently, at Muaun International Airport in South Korea.
The Vancouver aircraft overshot runway 08L by approximately 572m, becoming stuck in mud.
The South Korean disaster, with 179 fatalities, resulted from the aircraft crashing into a concrete wall 250m from the end of the runway [4].
Both of those airports have runway end safety areas (RESAs) far longer than those proposed at Toronto’s Island Airport [5].
If either of those incidents had occurred at the Island Airport, there would have been a high risk of multiple fatalities:
The current Island Airport’s RESAs are only 106m.
No Ministry regulation addresses the unique safety challenges presented by an airport bounded by water.
300m RESAs (or an equivalently effective backup method) were strongly recommended for all commercial airports in Canada after Air France Flight 358 ran off the end of the runway at Pearson in 2005.
The United States has required RESAs of 300m since 1989.
Internationally, 300m has been the standard since 1999.
Ports Toronto has known, ever since the Air France runway overshoot at Pearson, that its runway end safety areas were grossly inadequate, and that an overshoot could readily end up in deep water, with potential for fatalities.
This Airport does not become unsafe in 2027, when the RESA minimum requirement comes into force – it is unsafe now.
PortsToronto has ignored that risk, as it has ignored the real safety risk, again unique to its Airport, of emergency access in the event of a crash. Safety experts have established basic requirements that cannot be met without a bridge:
Any option must permit 64 emergency vehicles and 201 personnel to access an aircraft crash within 20 minutes. In addition ambulances with the critically injured must be capable of returning to the mainland within a 30 minute period of time.
Travellers using the Island Airport are indeed fortunate that there have been no runway overshoots or crashes to date.
Option 4 eliminates these safety risks.
1c: EMAS (Option 5) not considered in depth
Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS) is widely used in the US and are far more effective than a 150’ RESA at stopping overshooting aircraft.
It is the cheapest, and the most effective way to at arrest wayward aircraft. It can be built entirely on the existing landmass.
EMAS is well accepted at many US airports with similar climate. Why was it dismissed? What was in the “additional technical feasibility assessments?
Instead of taking a serious look at the EMAS alternative, the Gap Analysis, at page 9, gives it short shrift:
Alternative 3 [our Option 5] (Engineered Materials Arresting System) presents certain operational and business risks, including the need for repairs in the event of damage from aircraft or equipment excursions. Failure to address these issues promptly could result in runway closure, which directly affects the preservation of existing runway operations, and the airport’s current level of service. Also, Engineered Materials Arresting System has a limited lifespan (up to 20 years), requiring more frequent maintenance, rehabilitation, and possible reconstruction. These ongoing repairs and replacements add both operational costs and disruptions. In response to public feedback from the first open house on July 17, 2024, Engineered Materials Arresting System was reconsidered and reviewed again. However, the above noted constraints represent unacceptable operational and feasibility risks considering that other more practical, longer-lasting, and sustainable alternatives are available. Therefore, Alternative 3 - Engineered Materials Arresting System has been ruled out.
2. Minimum standards for environmental assessments not applied
The "environmental assessment” carried out by the RESA proponent, Ports Toronto, does not meet reasonable minimum standards for an environmental assessment.
Those minimum reasonable standards are those applicable under the Canada Impact Assessment Act.
The Practitioner’s Guide to Federal Impact Assessments (the Guide) provides helpful information on those minimum reasonable standards:
Proponents of designated projects are required to submit two documents during the planning phase,
An Initial Project Description of the designated project. The 180-day planning phase of the impact assessment process starts when the Agency posts a copy of the Initial Project. Description on the Canadian Impact Assessment Registry Internet Site.
No such Description was posted
A Detailed Project Description of the designated project, which provides more detailed information about the designated project and updates the information provided in the Initial Project Description in response to issues raised by provincial, territorial and Indigenous jurisdictions, Indigenous groups, the public, federal authorities and other participants during consultations and engagement and includes the proponent’s response to the Summary of Issues.
As no Initial Project Description was posted, there was no opportunity for the public to raise issues
3. Public engagement woefully inadequate
States the Guide:
‘Public participation is an essential part of open, informed and meaningful impact assessment. The Government of Canada is committed to providing the public with the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the process and to provide them with the information needed to participate in an informed way.
The Impact Assessment Act (the Act) requires the development of a Public Participation Plan during the Planning phase for all projects subject to an impact assessment. The Public Participation Plan is designed to provide proponents, the public and other participants with certainty about how and when public participation will occur.
No such Public Participation Plan was provided. Public consultation has involved only two meetings one in the middle of summer (July 17 ,2024) and the other on October 15 (duplicated on the afternoon and evening) with inadequate time allowed for questions and comments, and, at the second, no opportunity for those online to comment or ask questions, at all.
Scheduling the first public meeting in the midst of the summer is not an effective way to obtain community input.
We submit the public engagement carried out on behalf of Ports Toronto was cursory, and wholly inadequate.
From the Guide:
… Once the Agency determines that an Initial Project Description is complete, the Agency will post the document on the Registry and will engage and consult with provincial, territorial and Indigenous jurisdictions, Indigenous groups, the public, federal authorities and other participants to inform the Summary of Issues.
No such engagement or consultation with the public on the Project Description occurred.
The Agency will post the draft Public Participation Plan to the Registry for public comment.
No such draft Public Participation Plan was posted and no public comment was sought.
… Following the engagement on an Initial Project Description, the Agency will provide the proponent with a Summary of Issues document that includes issues raised by provincial, territorial and Indigenous jurisdictions, Indigenous groups, the public, federal authorities and other participants. The Summary of Issues allows participants to see how their comments and concerns have been characterized.
No Summary of Issues was provided. It is at this point that the scope of the inquiry should have been broadened to include the 4th and 5th options.
In his Report to Council dated September 27, 2024 the City of Toronto’s Deputy City Manager, Development and Growth stated:
City staff are not recommending changes to the term of the Tripartite Agreement in this report, as this issue is also best considered as a part of an airport master planning exercise and following robust consultation.
Now that City Council has agreed to extend the City’s lease of airport lands to Ports Toronto by 12 years, this environmental assessment is the only remaining opportunity in our lifetime to ensure that robust consultation occurs.
After release of its “EA” for comment, PT has refused to attend a community meeting called to review it and consider the community’s response.
4. The Airport’s Failing Business
For the purposes of impact assessments, economic effects can be defined as:
“The positive and adverse consequences of a designated project on components of the economy at the local, regional, and national levels.” [8]
Options 1-3 as identified by PortsToronto have similar economic impact. What they need to be compared to is Option 4- rejecting the RESA project.
The Airport is in significant decline.
When one considers spending a vast sum on a capital project such as a RESA, one should first determine if the demand will be there for it to be economically justified.
While at one point all 202 slots (landings + takeoffs) at the Airport were used – Porter had rights to 172 and Air Canada the balance – our latest look at the actual number, on June 11, 2025 revealed just 48 commercial arrivals (11 Air Canada, and 37 Porter) of which 23 were from Ottawa or Montreal, and 48 departures (36 Porter and 12 Air Canada), 24 to Montreal and Ottawa. [9]
A decline of more than 50% from its peak.
High-speed rail between Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal, as contemplated by ALTO and the federal government would shift a considerable portion of the passenger traffic flying out of the Island Airport to it, eliminating much of the Island Airport’s rationale for its existence: on June 11, 2025, about half of the flights from the Island Airport were to or from Montreal and Ottawa.
This graph, prepared by Alstrom, one of the early proponents for the high speed rail project, shows how sensitive passengers’ travel decisions are to travel time – most chose train over air when travel time falls below three hours:
As noted in the recent ALTO presentation to Toronto City Council, travel times to Ottawa are projected to be just 2 hours and 9 minutes, and to Montreal, 3 hours and 7 minutes – enough to significantly displace air travel to those cities.
Like City Express and Air Ontario, which both failed in their efforts to profitably fly out of the Island Airport, Porter admits losses at the Island Airport of $18,910,000 in 2017, a projected $40M in 2018, and $30M in 2019, has focussed increasingly on its business at Pearson, and reduced its Island Airport flights from a peak of 172 per day by about half, depending on the day.
Porter has threatened to leave the Island Airport, accepting that people prefer the better choice of flights at Pearson, and the convenience of the Union-Pearson Express train to get there.
Other airlines have not demonstrated any interest in using the Airport: for a while, Nieuport, the owner of the Island Airport terminal, trumpeted a new American airline Connect. Its paltry number of destinations won’t replace the business it was doing with Porter. And its application for authority to engage in schedule passenger air transportation to the US Department of Transport denied as it failed to provide required financial information to support a positive financial fitness finding.
Pearson is more than able to absorb the Island Airport’s business.
The Airport is heavily subsidized:
The City of Toronto leases a portion of the Airport lands, a parking lot, and queuing lanes to Ports Toronto for nominal rent.
Ports Toronto obtained ownership of the rest of the Airport lands (originally donated by the City to its Harbour Commission for port purposes) for free and generously passes that benefit on to its users.
An analysis shows Ports Toronto pays property taxes for the Airport at a rate far below other businesses in Toronto – over 20 years, providing a subsidy from the taxpayers of Toronto of, conservatively, $36,607,528.
These subsidies disappear if Option 4 is chosen.
We conclude that consideration of the Airport’s business prospects and economics should form part of a comprehensive environmental assessment.
5. Climate Change Impact
To reach the Federal government climate change targets of 40-45% emissions reductions below 2005 levels by 2030 and Net Zero by 2050, every order of government needs to take sustained and aggressive action. This should include serious consideration of carbon impacts of all new projects.
Aviation has not, and is not, contributing to the efforts to achieve that goal. No steps are identified in the Government’s progress report [10] that address aviation.
Although aviation’s emissions are a significant contributor to the climate crisis, the Airport’s impact and alternatives that are more climate friendly are not being considered.
International Association for Impact Assessment states, in its Best Practices:
As a first step in an Impact Assessment, it is necessary to identify whether and how:
The proposal will, directly or indirectly, increase or decrease greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
The proposal may be beneficially or adversely affected by, and vulnerable to, climate change either directly or indirectly.
Climate change may affect elements of the environment that are potentially affected by the proposal.
The proposal could be used to identify measures to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change.
Once the climate change implications, including the uncertainties, are understood, decisions about the proposal (accept, modify, or reject) should be based on the precautionary principle of "do no harm" and the principles of sustainable development.
PortsToronto has done none of this, to date.
At a minimum, projects that continue to invest in, and expand, aviation infrastructure such as the RESA initiative, should be discouraged as inconsistent with those climate goals.
6. Health Impact
Continuing aviation operations at the Airport (options 1 6) will have potentially devastating impacts on abutting residents’ health.
Option 4, not considered by Ports Toronto, would result in a significant reduction of harmful emissions from the Airport’s operations.
Airports have increasingly been recognized as potential sources of air pollution in urban areas, especially for neighbouring communities
Higher levels of air pollutant such as ultra fine particles are often observed at and near Airports.
The study found worrisome levels of ultrafine particles in the residential community just north of the Airport which were identified as coming from the aircraft using the Airport.
Short-term UFP Spikes Evident across the Neighbourhood
To quote the study's Executive Summary,
“When wind comes from the southward direction of the airport, UFP concentrations are, on average, two to three times higher across the neighbourhood as compared to: i) when wind comes from a northward direction, or ii) background concentrations at Hanlan’s Point.”
and
“Despite the emissions from the airport, the overall average UFP concentration across BQN is similar to that in busy/high-traffic neighbourhoods in Toronto. This is because the wind only comes from the southward direction of the airport some of the time, balanced out by other times, when the wind comes from the parts of the lake where there are no nearby upwind sources.”
Another recent McGill University study, reported in the Globe and Mail: “Ultrafine particles linked to 1,100 deaths per year in Montreal, Toronto”, found that a microscopic air pollutant generated from vehicles and industry plays a role in the deaths of an estimated 1,100 people in Canada’s two biggest cities each year.
The Airport abuts a residential area, unlike most other airports, and the impact of its UFP emissions are therefore not diluted with distance.
Also requiring investigation is the impact of emissions of a toxin contained in aviation gas (avgas) used in some aircraft: lead.
The lead emitted from certain aircraft engines burning avgas may be dispersed into the environment in two ways: emissions through aircraft taxiing and takeoff and landing; and through atmospheric dispersion from aircraft overhead with lead particles eventually settling and potentially contaminating soil and water leading to health issues.
This is particularly problematic for children living between 500 and 1,000metres near airports that service piston-engine aircraft. Studies have shown that they are at greatest risk due to elevated blood lead levels. According to Google Maps, the distance between the neighbourhood Waterfront School and the Airport is approximately 800 metres. As Fig. 6-11 above also shows, approximately 110,000 local and general aviation aircraft movements are forecast annually and slated to grow over the next ten years.
It is important to note that local and general aviation aircraft primarily use avgas and there is currently available no public data on how much leaded fuel they consume and how much and where lead is deposited. However, the school's proximity to the airport is reason enough to ensure the environmental assessment provides figures to assess the scale of the contamination.
Further background information on the impact of the airport on the health of those living and enjoying the waterfront lands can be found in the Toronto Public Health’s Health Impact Assessment (HIA) looking at Porter’s jets proposal in 2013.
It stated
The HIA indicates that people living in the neighbourhoods on the central waterfront are exposed to health risks from airport-related air pollution, noise, and traffic. In addition, the neighbourhoods adjacent to the BBTCA include higher proportions of some populations that may be especially vulnerable to the airport’s health impacts. The findings of the HIA suggest that the long-term presence of the airport on the City's Central Waterfront is more important in determining the health of the people who live and spend time there, than incremental changes to the airport's operations.
7. Noise Impact
Ports Toronto has admitted the Q400, the only aircraft flown out of the Airport commercially, breaches two of the three ceilings for noise:
Comparison of Q400 to Limits in Tripartite
Q402 | Tripartite | |
Flyover | 78 | 84 |
Lateral | 84 | 83.5 |
Approach | 93.1 | 92 |
As Tamara Bernstein, Artistic Director, Summer Music in the Toronto Music Garden, from 2001 to 2020, recently put it:
“The Toronto Music Garden is a magical venue, and a creation of genius on Toronto’s central waterfront. Its free concerts all summer long quickly became part of that magic – a glorious alchemy of place, music, and attentive, enthusiastic audiences.
“Unfortunately, that pleasure is blighted by the brutal noise of airplanes at Toronto Island Airport – noise that worsened over the years with the expansion of the airport facilities. Toronto’s magnificent waterfront should belong to everyone. It is no place for an airport.”
Options 1-3 continue this unacceptable and prohibited level of noise. Option 4 does not.
8. Potential for conflict of interest
It is unseemly for a project proponent to also conduct the purported assessment. The potential for conflict of interest is obvious.
9. Secrecy
PortsToronto has conducted the purported assessment in secrecy, refusing to share documents prepared by its consultants.
A study by Avia NG was referred to in the July 17 meeting but has never been disclosed.
Nor have the details of why that study rejected three options.
And Nieuport (the owner of the terminal at the Airport) is refusing to release its report on the economic impact of the introduction of US Customs preclearance at the Island Airport.
Its press release last May 30 included this:
“recent research by York Aviation indicates that Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport has the potential to deliver $5.3 billion in economic output through the increased aviation activity that Preclearance will bring about," said Neil Pakey, president and CEO, Nieuport Aviation, owner and operator of the passenger terminal at Billy Bishop Toronto City Airport.
But that research was not released to the public. PnP has asked and has not had the courtesy of a reply.
The original research was released in 2021, but the update citing that huge figure for economic benefit was not. The original report based its estimate on passenger volumes far in excess of reality: it predicts 4.5M passengers in 2023 – in reality, the Airport had only 2M passengers in 2023, and its major user, Porter Air is focussing its operations at Pearson, cutting back significantly on its Island Airport operations.
10. Rushed timelines
Transport Canada's RESA regulation came into effect December 21, 2021, affecting airports with an annual minimum of 325,000 passengers or greater per year for two consecutive years.
As early as June 2012 PortsToronto acknowledged through its 2012 Airport Master Plan its recognition of its RESA requirement.
“It is anticipated that Runway End Safety Areas (RESAs) will become a mandatory regulatory requirement over the next five (5) years. Therefore, [Ports Toronto], in cooperation with Transport Canada and the City of Toronto (i.e. signatories to the Tripartite Agreement), should assume that these regulatory requirements will require amendments to the Tripartite Agreement.”
In the meantime through consultations with the Transportation Safety Board, Transportation Canada advanced RESA regulations:
in 2016 Transport Canada called for public consultation on RESA regulations,
in 2020 Transport Canada published the proposed regulations,
on January 5, 2022 the regulations took effect.
One year later, in early 2023, PortsToronto initiated discussions with the City of Toronto and Transport Canada on RESA implementation.
To quote the City's background file, page 16,
“With RESA implementation required by mid-2027, PortsToronto initiated discussions with City and Transport Canada staff in early 2023. At the time, PortsToronto identified the need to implement RESA and indicated a desire to review other areas of the Tripartite Agreement that it saw as outdated.”
A year and a half later, July 17, 2024, PortsToronto shared with the public its process to secure the necessary plans, approvals, construction and completion by Q2 2027 to meet RESA regulation requirements.
Why did PortsToronto take 10 years from its recognition that RESA requirements would become a reality, then drag its feet for a year before sitting down with the City, then finally take another year and a half to notify the public?
PortsToronto's failure to take action promptly on RESAs, choosing instead to ignore the impending deadline until it ran out of time, suggests that neither the City nor the community should accede to Ports Toronto’s now-rushed timelines. This is a mess of its own making.
11. Result prejudged
The website for the purported assessment is called “Safe Clean Quiet". A misnomer, as the Airport is neither safe (see Safety Impact, above), nor clean (See Heath Impact, above), nor quiet (see Environmental Impact, above). Ports Toronto’s choice of this name suggests it has prejudged the result of the assessment it is carrying out, concluding that the Airport, with the RESA project completed, is safe, clean and quiet.
These are our submissions. We would be pleased to discuss them at your convenience.
Brian Iler
Spokesperson for Parks not Planes
[1] Even though City staff had reported to Council that “staff are of the view that PortsToronto has both fiscal capacity and tools sufficient to self-finance the associated $65 million costs of RESA Option 1 based on historical financial performance.”
[2] See BlogTO
[3] EcoJustice echos this, stating “The “no” should always be on the table, as should any reasonable alternatives to the project that exist.”
[4] See AvHerald
[5] About 106 metres of suitable terrain is available at the Island Airport off both runway ends
[7] The referenced EMAS brochure contains this statement:
“What happens in case of an overrun?
After all passengers are evacuated, the first step is to remove the aircraft. This is usually done by pulling the plane out backwards along its own tracks.
The second step is to remove any loose parts and, if necessary, to put on a temporary top cover. After this, the runway becomes functional again.
The last step is to restore the functionality of the greenEMAS by repairing only the damaged parts. This should usually be done within 45 days”
[8] Para 5.3 here
[9] 47 of 96 flights. At one point, there were 202 daily flights to and from the Island Airport. Its business has already fallen drastically.
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